# Responsible Bundling of Microfinance Services

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WORKING PAPER
MARCH 2016
Responsible Bundling of Microfinance Services
A Mixed Method Evaluation of the Impact of
Timing, Pressure, and Information
Emily Zimmerman, Jonathan Bauchet, Barbara Magnoni, and Vance Larsen

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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
Table of Contents
Executive Summary......................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 2
2. A Review of Literature Relevant to Bundling Crop Insurance .................................................................... 3
2.1. Potential value but low demand for agricultural insurance ....................................................... 3
2.2. Drivers of demand for insurance .................................................................................................... 4
2.3. Costs and benefits of bundling financial products .................................................................. 4
2.4. Link among information, education, and purchase decisions ................................................ 5
2.5. Information overload, stress and the purchase decision ............................................................ 6
2.6. Understanding and recalling information .................................................................................... 7
2.7. Implications for the research ......................................................................................................... 7
3. Selecting a Financial Service Partner in Rural Colombia .......................................................................... 8
3.1. Crezcamos ........................................................................................................................................ 8
3.2. Crop insurance ................................................................................................................................ 8
3.3. Sales protocol for crop insurance .................................................................................................. 10
3.3.1. A video tool to standardize sales and support loan officers ....................................... 11
3.3.2. Feedback on the sales protocol and tools ................................................................... 11
4. Study Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 12
4.1. Sample selection .............................................................................................................................. 12
4.2. The sales intervention ............................................................................................................... 12
4.3. Sources of quantitative data ......................................................................................................... 13
4.4. Descriptive statistics of the quantitative sample .......................................................................... 14
4.5. Qualitative data .............................................................................................................................. 15
5. Findings ......................................................................................................................................................... 16
5.1. Take-up rate was comparatively high, but average coverage was low ................................. 16
5.2. Price was highly relevant to the purchase decision .................................................................... 17
5.3. Perceptions of the product’s quality and relevance varied but were
generally positive ............................................................................................................................. 18
5.4. Product understanding was relatively high, but recall was low ................................................. 20
5.5. Direct pressure to purchase the product was almost completely absent ................................ 22
5.6. Some clients may feel indirect pressure to purchase insurance, linked to low
levels of empowerment ................................................................................................................... 23
5.7. The unbundling intervention did not influence clients ................................................................. 24
6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................... 27
6.1. Distraction and cognitive load did not affect take-up, understanding, or recall .................... 27
6.2. Drivers of client purchases .............................................................................................................. 27
6.3. Low recall suggests a need for ongoing support ......................................................................... 29
6.4. Implications for financial service providers bundling other products and services ................... 30
References ...................................................................................................................................................... 32
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
Executive Summary
Financial institutions serving the poor can offer a range of savings, insurance, and even nonfinancial
products in addition to their core credit products. Bundling these products into one packaged sale can be
a cost-effective distribution strategy and a means to differentiate the provider’s offering by its added value
to clients. However, it may also raise the risk of confusing clients who receive too much information at once
and do not fully understand the secondary products they are offered or the risk that clients feel pressure
(whether direct or indirect) to purchase those ancillary products.
We partnered with Crezcamos, a microfinance institution in rural Colombia, to explore the influence of a joint
sales strategy on the uptake, understanding, and recall of crop insurance products. Our mixed-methods
research design combined qualitative interviews with end clients, loan officers, and other Crezcamos staff
with a randomized intervention testing the impact of “unbundling,” or separating the insurance offer from
the loan application process on take-up and understanding of the insurance. We worked with Crezcamos to
develop a standardized approach to offering the insurance product, which relied on an explanatory video
and other tools and emphasized crucial information about the product while underscoring the voluntary
nature of the client’s decision.
Findings
Overall take-up of the crop insurance was 23 percent for our full sample over the study period, which
compares favorably to take-up of similar products in other countries. However, clients purchased relatively
small amounts of coverage when compared to the maximum amounts they could have purchased. Price
was an extremely relevant consideration in purchase decisions, and our findings suggest a high degree
of price sensitivity, which may have been exacerbated by the fact that premiums (while highly subsidized
and quite low for the coverage offered) were much higher than those charged for insurance products with
which clients were more familiar. The novelty of the insurance product seems also to have contributed to
clients’ decisions to purchase low amounts of coverage. Perceptions of the product and coverage were
generally positive, even among nonpurchasers, although a small minority of clients did not find the product
useful. Relevance of the coverage seems to have been the single most important determinant of purchase
decisions.
Although most clients understood at the time of the offer the product features they needed to make an
informed purchase decision, later survey data reveal low recall of product information that is suggestive of
a possible gap in clients’ ability to maintain and use their policies effectively without additional support from
Crezcamos.
almost completely absent. Most
Direct pressure from loan officers or Crezcamos to purchase the product was
clients did not perceive indirect pressure to purchase the insurance, although we found some suggestion
that some borrowers who were less empowered, more vulnerable, or more worried about the loan approval
may have felt indirect pressure.
Contrary to our hypothesis, offering insurance separately from the loan application process did not increase
take-up of the product, nor did it improve clients’ understanding or recall of purchase decisions or product
details. Distraction was not a relevant influence for Crezcamos clients during either the joint or separate
insurance offer.
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Implications
Our findings suggest that the opportunities associated with bundling crop insurance or other financial
services with loans can far outweigh the drawbacks. From the supply side, bundling reduces the cost of
delivery, particularly in rural areas where loan officers travel long distances to visit clients. From the demand
side, our findings suggest that a bundled offer does not negatively impact clients’ purchase decisions or
understanding. In fact, we find some indication that selling insurance at a time when farmers are thinking
about their investments in their crops (during the loan application) may help increase the perceived
relevance of the product and lead to greater understanding and recall.
Our research suggests that a bundled crop insurance product for low-income farmers can have relatively
high overall take-up (compared to similar products) if it is voluntary, affordable, relevant to clients’ needs,
and well-understood at the time of the offer. However, even this comparatively high take-up left the
purchase rates suggest that some insurance
majority of Crezcamos clients with no coverage at all, and low
purchasers may remain insufficiently protected.
The low recall of product details suggests that ongoing post-sales support is needed and that reminders
of coverage may be useful, though they should be carefully designed to be useful and appreciated. The
case of Crezcamos suggests that the responsibility to protect consumers in low-income settings might fall
disproportionally on the distribution channel.
1. Introduction
Many financial institutions serving the poor have, in recent years, expanded the breadth of services they
offer beyond their core credit offerings to include a wider range of savings, insurance, and other products.
Bundling products (delivering multiple products at once) can be a cost-effective distribution strategy as
1
well as a way to differentiate the provider’s offering. However, it must be done carefully, as it has potential
to raise a number of challenges. If too much information about too many different products is given at
once, some consumers may not understand or use all of that information to make decisions that best
address their financial needs. Clients may be denied the opportunity to make a truly free choice about
which products to buy. This is true of mandatory bundled products, but can also occur when the additional
bundled products are ostensibly voluntary, if clients feel direct or indirect pressure. In particular, some clients
may worry that turning down the offer of a bundled product may reduce their chance of receiving a loan.
Others may purchase a product despite (or perhaps because of) their failure to fully understand it. When
the loan application involves extensive paperwork and questions, unfamiliar processes, or stress about the
loan outcome, distraction and information overload may contribute to poor understanding and decision-
making. When the secondary bundled product is complex or unfamiliar, these problems may compound.
Bundling has implications for consumer protection, to the extent that clients are not afforded the opportunity
to make truly free and adequately informed choices. If they do purchase a product, poor understanding can
hinder a client’s ability to use the product effectively. From a commercial perspective, selling products that
clients do not fully understand, value, or wish to purchase can negatively impact client loyalty, especially
in a competitive credit market. Conversely, when products are bundled responsibly, they may serve as a
powerful differentiator and build client loyalty. They can offer clients tools to address a broader array of their
needs in a convenient “one stop” manner.
1. We use the term “bundling” to refer to the joint offer of multiple financial products at once, whether the client is
required to purchase all bundled products together or not. Both scenarios raise similar opportunities and concerns.
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
These issues are particularly striking in the rural context, although they are certainly not unique to rural areas.
Education levels are lower and experience with financial services is often more limited than in many urban
settings, leaving clients more vulnerable to misunderstanding or manipulation. However, the high cost of
distributing financial products in these areas makes the potential gains (to both clients and providers) from
bundling products even greater.
Our study sought to gain insight into the experience of rural clients when they are offered bundled financial
services, including a relatively complex agricultural insurance product. We aimed to better understand
how to offer such products responsibly, generating take-up as well as supporting clients’ understanding
and memory of product details. We hypothesize that bundling the insurance offer with the loan application
may influence a client’s ability and interest in retaining information about additional products during the
loan application and his or her perception of any direct or indirect pressure to purchase the insurance.
Specifically, our research seeks to answer the following:
&#x95; Does unbundling or separating the marketing of an insurance product from the loan application
impact clients’ understanding and uptake of insurance?
&#x95; How does the cost-effective process of bundling products and delivering information about new
products in conjunction with the loan application influence clients’ ability to process and retain this
information, as well as their purchase decisions?
&#x95; To what extent does a standardized marketing tool support responsible sales, client understanding,
and retention of pertinent information?
To address these questions, we conducted a mixed methods evaluation of the delivery of a crop insurance
product by a microfinance institution in rural Colombia. The study combines a randomized control trial with
extensive qualitative research, exploring the purchase decisions, understanding, and perceptions of loan
applicants who have been offered the product and collecting extensive qualitative feedback from the
microfinance staff who offer it. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the
relevant literature; Section 3 offers an overview of the context, the insurance product, and how it is sold;
Section 4 describes our study methodology; Section 5 describes our findings; and Section 6 concludes.
2. A Review of Literature Relevant to Bundling Crop Insurance
2.1. Potential value but low demand for agricultural insurance
Farmers around the world face enormous and varied risks, and there is strong evidence that this uninsured risk
has immense welfare effects and also constrains the investment that farmers make in their farms, suggesting
great potential value for agricultural insurance products (see Hill, Zimmerman, and Magnoni [2014] for a
review of the literature). However, demand for these products remains almost universally low. Hill and Robles
(2010) found that on average about 10 percent of potential clients of index insurance products buy them.
Even where extensive subsidies and other costly efforts are made to increase demand, take-up typically
remains well below 50 percent. Cole et al. (2013) studied take-up of a weather index insurance product in
India, and found that even with high subsidies and extensive educational and marketing interventions, take-
2
up was around 28 percent. Households that were not exposed to these interventions designed to increase
demand had take-up near zero. Kalavakonda and Mahul (2005) found that take-up of the government-
2. The authors find evidence that lack of trust, price, liquidity constraints, and limited salience are all significant
constraints to demand.
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sponsored agricultural (area yield) insurance in India was only 11.6 percent among small and marginal
3
farmers, who were eligible for a 40 percent premium subsidy.
2.2. Drivers of demand for insurance
The drivers of demand for agricultural and other insurance among low-income households are complex
and varied. McCord, Magnoni, and Zimmerman (2012) and Eling, Pradhan, and Schmit (2014) reviewed the
literature on demand factors. Some of the most relevant determinants of demand relate to characteristics
of the product, cost, and information, specifically the following:
&#x95; Salience of the covered risk
&#x95; Appropriate product features
&#x95; Adequate coverage
&#x95; Price
&#x95; Liquidity constraints
&#x95; Experience with insurance
&#x95; Financial literacy
&#x95; Understanding of the product offered
&#x95; Decisions and recommendations of peers
&#x95; Trust in the insurer and/or distributor
Dalal and Morduch (2010) discussed the psychological factors that can limit demand for microinsurance,
drawing from behavioral economics to suggest (among others) the following strategies to increase take-
up:
&#x95; Avoid overwhelming customers with too many choices.
&#x95; Appeal to individuals’ fear of loss, rather than advertising the benefits of insurance.
&#x95; Make the risk and the insurance product salient.
&#x95; Undermine potential customers’ overconfidence regarding the covered events.
&#x95; Eliminate obstacles to purchase.
2.3. Costs and benefits of bundling financial products
Wuebker, Baumgarten, Schmidt-Gallas, and Koderisch (2008) noted that effective bundling can offer
convenient, “one-stop-shop” options at a reduced cost due to savings in delivery. Yet bundling alone
may not solve difficulties in selling products with low demand. The authors also cautioned that while
effective bundling strategies in financial services can lead to increased sales in both lead and additional
products, including too many “filler products” in a bundle with a “lead” product might backfire, causing
clients to abandon the package and move to a “lead-only” solution. In the case of microfinance, this
would represent a loss, as a client’s unbundled alternative would likely be taking a loan from a competing
institution or avoiding borrowing altogether. Banerjee, Duflo, and Hornbeck (2014) found that a large fraction
of borrowers (16 percentage points) were willing to give up a microfinance loan to avoid purchasing a
mandatory bundled health insurance product, and the majority of those clients lost access to microfinance
altogether. Similarly, Giné and Yang (2009) found in a study of a mandatory bundled index-based weather
insurance policy, priced at actuarially fair rates, that take-up of the loan was lower by 13 percentage points
among farmers offered insurance with the loan. The insurance product forgave the loan in the event of
poor rainfall, and the authors suggest that farmers are already implicitly insured due to the limited liability
inherent in the loan contract, and as a result did not see value in the insurance product. By contrast, a bank
3. The authors suggest that low demand is due to limitations in product design and liquidity constraints.
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in Ghana experienced increases in demand through a bundled savings-linked insurance product. Clients
who maintained a savings balance of US$60 were eligible for free life insurance coverage. During the five
months after the insurance product was launched, all deposits increased by 19 percent, and deposits by
clients under US$60 increased by 207 percent, as clients saved more to access the insurance (Matul, Dalal,
De Bock, and Gelade 2013).
Bundling financial services has important consumer protection implications as well. Clients may be pressured
into buying something that they do not need or want, or may not be aware of the details of their coverage.
These concerns are particularly relevant when the bundled product is mandatory (e.g., the credit-life
insurance that accompanies many microfinance loans), but can also arise in the case of voluntary products.
Offering low-value products, mis-selling, failing to provide relevant information, or failing to provide the
support that clients need to use products effectively and make claims are consumer protection problems
that commonly arise in microinsurance sales (Zimmerman, Magnoni, and Camargo [2014] created a
framework of four main categories of consumer protection in microinsurance, including these and other
issues). When the individuals selling insurance are, like many microfinance loan officers, not well trained in
all aspects of the products they sell, the potential for misinformation or mis-selling may be greater.
Despite the potential drawbacks to bundling financial products, this strategy presents clear advantages
in terms of reducing delivery costs and increasing outreach. Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, and Mordoch (2009)
documented the high operating costs borne by microfinance lenders, driven by the difficulty of reaching
and serving microfinance borrowers and by their
low average loan sizes. Among a sample of 346
lenders, the study found median operating costs
of 26 percent and 17 percent of the cost of loans
for nongovernmental organizations and nonbank
financial institutions, respectively. These high
operating costs may be seen as a justification for
the cost-effective strategy of delivering multiple
products at once, particularly in rural areas where
large distances and difficult road access add to
the cost of delivering services. As such, strategies
to bundle financial services must be considered
in efforts to reach excluded populations with
financial services. However, the perspective and
understanding of the client must be carefully In our setting, Crezcamos loan officers travel hours from their
considered to ensure that they are offered branch office to meet with clients on their farms.
appropriate services that they understand and
value.
2.4. Link among information, education, and purchase decisions
Of particular relevance from the consumer perspective is their understanding of the products offered and
how that understanding influences purchase decisions. Lack of sufficient understanding is sometimes cited
by potential clients as a reason for not buying insurance (Giné et al. 2008; Takahashi, Ikegami, Sheahan,
and Barrett 2016). Understanding a product may also lead to higher renewal rates, as it helps to avoid
disappointment with the product (Platteau and Ontiveros 2013).
Financial education has been tested as an intervention that might significantly improve understanding
insurance. However, the impact of financial education and financial literacy on insurance purchase
decisions has also been shown to be mixed. Several studies conclude that providing more information
about microinsurance products does not directly increase take-up. Cole et al. (2013) found that while
general financial literacy is positively correlated with demand for a rainfall insurance product in India, a
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short insurance education module had no significant effect on demand. The authors suggest that this
inefficacy was due to its short length. Takahashi, Ikegami, Sheahan, and Barrett (2016) found that learning
kits (including comics, skit tapes, and other tools) contributed to better knowledge of livestock insurance,
but this did not significantly increase uptake. Similarly, Schultz, Metcalfe, and Gray (2013) found that financial
literacy programs and reminders were effective at raising knowledge of health insurance, but not take-up.
The authors posited that lack of understanding was not a barrier to enrollment, because baseline rates of
insurance understanding were already high. In a study of a financial education radio program in Colombia,
Sanchez, Rodriquez, and Zamora (2014) found a significant impact on listeners’ knowledge of risks they are
exposed to and the types of insurance available (the primary focus of most program sessions). Listeners’
perceived capacity regarding their own knowledge of risk and insurance also increased. However, this
knowledge did not translate into changes in attitudes or behaviors toward insurance: no impact was found
on knowledge of insurance concepts, attitudes toward insurance, or insurance purchase.
However, some studies show that financial education can be effective in stimulating demand. Cai, de
(2013) found that participation in a financial education session (rather than receiving
Janvry, and Sadoulet
a basic explanation of the product) increased take-up of a weather insurance product. Gaurav, Cole, and
Tabacman (2011) found that a short insurance education module did not increase take-up, but a two-day
educational program, involving games that simulate rainfall insurance, increased insurance demand by
five percentage points. The mixed results point to the possibility that the content, timing, and delivery of
financial education in a market where valuable microinsurance products are accessible, may play a role in
its effectiveness in influencing client purchasing decisions.
2.5. Information overload, stress, and the purchase decision
More information can help individuals to make better purchase decisions, but only up to a certain point.
When individuals receive too much information, their ability to process and use the information declines,
they can become overwhelmed and confused, and the quality of their decisions suffers. Eppler and Mengis
(2004) reviewed the literature on information overload. Diversity, novelty, and complexity of information
can all contribute to information overload. Its effects include stress and cognitive strain, loss of control
over information, lower decision quality, and lower satisfaction with the decision made. These factors may
lead some consumers to (rationally) avoid making financial decisions. Reis (2004) modeled consumers’
expectations formation and predicts that, due to the cost of acquiring, absorbing, and processing
information, consumers rationally choose to only sporadically recompute their consumption plans.
information overload may be particularly large in the context of financial
The effects of inattention and
decisions by low-income people. Mullainathan and Shafir (2014) discussed the specific context of poverty
and how scarcity of resources can reduce a person’s mental bandwidth and force her to focus on the
present, leaving little space for long-term planning and decision-making. Karlan, McConnell, Mullainathan,
and Zinman (2010) found that limited attention leads to low household savings levels, and that reminders
increased savings and were most effective when they mentioned an individual’s specific savings goal.
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) developed a theoretical model positing that the nonpoor, by virtue of
owning distraction-saving goods and services at home, are able to focus more on their work (i.e., the effects
of distraction are greater for the poor).
Psychological stressors, such as fear or anxiety, can lead consumers to process and assimilate information
poorly, to fail to fully consider alternatives, and to postpone or avoid making purchase decisions at all.
Stress may also decrease consumers’ willingness to pay by shifting their attention away from more abstract
features of the product (Maier and Wilken 2014). Although we are not aware of any literature on stress
associated specifically with the microfinance loan application process, several studies have demonstrated
that having a microfinance loan can lead to higher levels of general stress and anxiety (e.g., Fernald et al.
2008; Karlan and Zinman 2011).
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
2.6. Understanding and recalling information
From a consumer protection perspective, information about a financial product is relevant both at the
time consumers make a purchase decision and later, as they maintain and use the product. In the context
of insurance, a consumer should at the time of the offer understand the basic features of the product to
make an informed purchase decision; these vary by product but generally include the price, covered
events, term, amount of coverage, property or individuals covered, and any major limitations or exclusions
(Zimmerman, Magnoni, and Camargo 2014). This is consistent with the Smart Campaign’s draft standards
regarding the information about insurance that should be shared with microfinance clients at the time
of enrollment (Smart Campaign 2015). After the purchase, a client must remember (or be reminded of)
some minimum amount of information to make a claim when a covered event strikes (i.e., existence of the
coverage, covered events, and how to initiate a claim) (Zimmerman, Magnoni, and Camargo 2014).
It is reasonable to expect that much of the information conveyed to a consumer at the time an insurance
product is offered may not (even if it is initially well-understood) be retained over time. Studies in such diverse
advertising (Singh, Mishra, Bendapudi, and Linville 1994), pairs of words (Runquist 1983),
contexts as television
and medical advice (Kessels 2003) have demonstrated that people forget a widely varying, but often large
proportion of information in the days and weeks after they receive it, even after demonstrating that they
initially understood the information. Reviewing literature on consumers’ recall of prices paid for consumer
goods, Monroe and Lee (1999) found that in nearly all studies, less than half of consumers could recall the
exact price paid soon after their purchase (recall ranged from 8 percent to 61 percent of consumers). We
are not aware of any studies of retention of information about financial products. However, the very limited
success of financial literacy programs in promoting knowledge gains suggests that financial information
may be particularly difficult to remember. A meta-analysis of studies of financial education programs found
that the interventions explained only 0.44 percent of the variance in financial knowledge, while meta-
analyses in other types of education show effects that are five to 13 times larger (Fernandes, Lynch, and
Netemeyer 2014).
2.7. Implications for the research
The literature shows that there is great potential value to smallholder farmers in agricultural insurance, but
quite low demand even where high subsidies and extensive educational and marketing interventions are
in place. Demand for insurance is driven by a wide variety of factors, including features of the product and
coverage, pricing, financial literacy, understanding of the product, experience, recommendations, trust,
and psychological factors. Bundling insurance with a microfinance loan can lead to significant efficiencies
for microfinance lenders, particularly given their high operating costs. This can lead to cost savings for clients
and/or make available to them low-margin products (such as some insurance) that would not be cost-
effective to distribute individually. However, it raises other concerns: some consumers may be pressured
into buying something they do not want or fully understand, while others may opt out of the lead loan
product to avoid an unwanted bundled product. Our study hypothesized that product information and
understanding may be particularly relevant to the purchase decision. While product understanding and
general financial literacy are sometimes linked to purchase decisions, the literature shows mixed evidence
on the effect of financial education on insurance demand (with more intensive programs and those that
refer to a specific product most likely to increase demand). We also hypothesized that stress or information
overload might influence purchase decisions during a bundled offer. The literature shows that receiving too
much information at once or experiencing fear or anxiety at the time of a decision can lead an individual
to make poorer decisions or avoid decision-making entirely, and these effects may be particularly large
for low-income people. The literature also suggests that, even if an individual can understand and process
information about a financial product in the moment he or she receives it, later recall of that information is
likely to be low.
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3. Selecting a Financial Service Partner in Rural Colombia
3.1. Crezcamos
To better understand some of the influences and perceptions behind
the purchase decision of bundled products, specifically crop insurance
bundled with a microfinance loan, we partnered with Crezcamos, a
microfinance institution based in Bucaramanga, Colombia. Crezcamos
serves over 70,000 clients with individual small business and agricultural
loans. Sixty-two percent of its clients live in rural areas, and 13 percent
have an agricultural activity financed by Crezcamos (2014). Agricultural
loans are offered for investment or consumption, with terms beginning at
three months, but more typically with terms between 12 and 24 months.
The loan approval process includes a visit to the applicant’s farm,
during which the loan officer completes an extensive loan application
(including a risk assessment) and offers additional insurance products
to the applicant. All Crezcamos borrowers purchase a compulsory
credit life insurance policy that covers their loan balance. In addition,
Crezcamos offers a number of voluntary insurance products to its clients,
including life insurance (with benefits going to a named beneficiary, not A Crezcamos borrower walks from
Crezcamos), property insurance covering the home or business, and the main road to his coffee farm.
vehicle insurance. Crezcamos recently began offering a crop insurance Rural Santander offers a variety of
product. This product is uniquely complex and is also new to both clients microclimates and weather risks that
and most loan officers, making it well-suited to test the concepts of place farmers at risk of drought, floods,
information overload, purchase decisions, and retention of information freezes, avalanches and strong winds.
from a bundled credit plus insurance offer.
Our study took place in the departments of Santander, North Santander,
and Cesar, a geographically diverse and agriculturally productive region.
A wide range of crops are grown in the region, including permanent
crops such as coffee, cacao, citrus, and guanabana (soursop), as well
as transitory crops such as potato, rice, and corn. Climate change has
created increasingly prevalent weather risk in the region, with potentially
devastating effects for the smallholder farmers that Crezcamos lends
to (World Bank 2009). The region is also characterized by its highly
competitive credit market; the small towns in which Crezcamos
branches are located are typically home to 10 or more lenders, with
clients frequently borrowing from multiple lenders.
3.2. Crop insurance
In 2014, Crezcamos began to roll out a new crop insurance product,
which is underwritten by the insurer Mapfre and designed to be
appropriate for the small farmers who comprise Crezcamos’s client base.
The insurance covers natural disaster risk for a variety of crops that are
common in the region (though several common crops are excluded);
all loan applicants who have an insurable crop are eligible to enroll.
Nonborrowers, including applicants whose loans are denied, are also Promotional materials for the insurance
eligible. Clients may purchase coverage for multiple crops, although caution customers that “anything
most typically insure only one principal crop. could happen to your crop.”
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The premium is calculated based on the crop and the insured amount; the Colombian government subsidizes
4
premiums by 60–80 percent. Policyholders are covered in the event of damage to their covered crop from
any of the following events: deficiency of rain, excess of rain, freezing, flood, hail, wind, avalanche, and
landslide. Policyholders receive a benefit in the case of death of the plants (for permanent crops, such
as coffee) or loss of expected yield (for transitory crops, such as potato). The coverage is not intended to
recover the full loss, but to cover “production costs”: the cost of buying new plants (for permanent crops)
or replanting in the next season (for transitory crops). However, policyholders may choose the amount to
insure (subject to a maximum amount corresponding to the crop and field size), and many choose to insure
a smaller amount than their actual production costs. For Crezcamos borrowers who have an outstanding
loan, any insurance payment first covers the balance of their loan, and the remainder is paid to the insured
in cash. Crezcamos loan officers receive a small commission based on the premium amount for sales. Box 1
summarizes the main product terms for two common crops in the region.
Box 1. Terms of the crop insurance
Table B1-1 summarizes the main terms of the crop insurance for permanent and transitory crops. Exact terms vary
by the crop, crop size, and the amount the client chooses to insure. In general, insurance for transitory crops is more
expensive in relation to the benefit amount, but also more likely to pay a benefit as it covers less severe events.
Table B1-1. Summary of Main Terms of Crop Insurance
Permanent Crops | Coverage for Plants Transitory Crops | Coverage for Yield
365 days Term of coverage 130–300 days (linked to the length of
the growing season)
$2,500–6,275 per hectare Maximum insured value (USD) $315–2,200 per hectare
3% of the insured value for most crops Total premium 4%–9% of the insured value (plus tax)
(plus tax)
80% for most crops Premium subsidy 60% for most crops
90% of insured value Benefit in case of a total loss 90% of insured value
The following are examples of coverage and price for two common crops, for a one-hectare farm:
Cocoa (Permanent Crop) Potato (Transitory Crop)
365 days Term of coverage 210 days
$3,587 Maximum insured value (USD) $2,092
Total: $113 Total: $198
Subsidy: $86 Premium (USD) Subsidy: $113
Paid by Client: $27 Paid by Client: $85
$3,228 Benefit in case of a total loss $1,883
(USD)
4. Total premiums are based on a rate of 3–8 percent of the insured amount, plus tax. The government subsidy rate
depends on the crop covered and whether the farmer meets the requirements to qualify as a “small producer”
(nearly all Crezcamos clients do).
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3.3. Sales protocol for crop insurance
In collaboration with Crezcamos, our research
team developed a standardized sales protocol for
the insurance, which served two purposes. First, the
protocol and associated tools support loan officers
in selling a complex new product both effectively
and responsibly on a voluntary basis. Second,
standardization helped to ensure loan officers took
a consistent approach to each sale, allowing us to
isolate the effect of the timing intervention described
in Section 4. This protocol consisted of the following
five steps:
1. Introduce the insurance by sensitizing clients to Crezcamos staff practice the standardized offer protocol.
the risk, with reference to past experience with
weather-related damage to the farmer’s or his
neighbor’s crops and stating four introductory
5
points about the product. Box 2. Content of the video
2. Show a video that explains the product features
and offers a brief testimonial from a claimant
(see 3.3.1). Product is
3. Calculate the exact premium and benefit introduced with
amount for the client’s situation using a reference to
worksheet. The objective of the worksheet was the objective of
to both streamline the calculations for the loan protecting one’s
officer and to demonstrate to the client both investment.
how the product is priced and how claims are
calculated.
4. Manage questions and concerns from the Narrator lists the
client. main covered
events (including
5. Complete enrollment forms if the client chooses landslides), with
to purchase the insurance. accompanying
visual depictions.
Loan officers were trained on the product details and
the protocol for the offer. They received a script to Basic terms of
follow in their explanation of the product, as well as the insurance
a guide of answers to “frequently asked questions” (including the
from clients. While some loan officers failed to premium, subsidy,
follow this protocol exactly (in particular, those who and coverage
had experience selling the crop insurance prior to amount) are
the study), loan officers generally appreciated, explained.
remembered, and used the tools and protocol (see
Section 3.3.2).
A claimant
describes how
the insurance
helped him
5. The crop insurance (1) is offered by Crezcamos, (2) when he lost his
protects the majority of the investment in a crop, (3) potato harvest.
has low cost, and (4) is designed for small farmers.
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3.3.1. A video tool to standardize sales and support loan officers
A brief video on the crop insurance was developed through a
collaboration among Crezcamos, Mapfre, and our research
team. This video was installed on loan officers’ company-provided
smartphones. It was shown to clients as part of the insurance offer
with the aim of standardizing the way the product was offered and
aiding loan officers in explaining a complex new product to their
clients. This video of approximately three minutes explains the terms
of the insurance product in a simple and highly visual manner and
includes a brief testimonial from a claimant (see Box 2 for an overview
of the video content).
The video was designed to serve both consumer protection and
marketing functions: to inform clients of how the insurance product
works (explaining the price, coverage, government subsidy, and
benefit amount) and to convince them of the product’s value by
showing how it helped a claimant recover from damage to his
crop. While the video’s content addressed both of these functions, Top: Crezcamos loan officer watches a
it placed more emphasis on informing than on marketing. This video explaining the crop insurance with
choice was made on the assumption that loan officers are adept a client and her family.
at finding creative ways to sell products, appealing to their clients Bottom: Crezcamos loan officers practice
at an individual level. However, because they are not insurance calculating the insurance premium and
experts and because their primary focus is often on sales, they may benefit during a training session.
not always be adept at explaining the details of a relatively complex
insurance product.
3.3.2. Feedback on the sales protocol and tools “He showed me the video, and
The sales guide (including the four key points about the insurance then I saw that, yes, I could really
product) was remembered and used by loan officers. In particular, benefit from this insurance.”
loan officers who felt nervous about explaining a complicated —Client, describing his reaction to
product appreciated the support this guide offered them to focus seeing the video when the insurance
on the most important details of the product. was offered
The video was very well received by both clients and loan officers.
Crezcamos has updated and is continuing to use the video after “The video is very didactic, and
completing the fieldwork and is considering creating similar tools it gives clients more confidence
for other products. Our qualitative interviews suggest that product about the product.”
details explained in the video were more likely to be understood and —Loan officer, reflecting on how the
remembered by clients than when this information was relayed by video supports sales
the loan officer (see Section 5).
Although some loan officers preferred not to use the video for
all clients, there was general agreement that it offered a clear “Clients like the video and it helps
explanation of the product, which was useful to support an informed them understand the product, but
purchase decision. Some Crezcamos staff felt that the video would they don’t really pay attention to
be more effective if it conveyed a more powerful emotional message the calculations.”
about the consequences of not having insurance protection. Others, —Loan officer, explaining how the
however, appreciated that the video did not make a “hard” sell. video supports client understanding
Several noted that it was a good way to introduce prospective clients (vs. other tools)
showing
to Crezcamos, by them a new and unexpected product
and explaining it clearly.
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The calculation worksheets were seen by most loan officers and by other Crezcamos staff as a useful
tool to explain coverage and price to clients, although some loan officers found them cumbersome and
some preferred not to use them. As part of the study, our research team developed a prototype for a
phone application that could automate the calculations to make the process easier for loan officers while
conveying this information to the client. While this application has not yet been rolled out due to logistical
complications, Crezcamos is continuing to explore this possibility.
Crezcamos developed the management of questions and concerns, with some input from the research
team. Crezcamos’ insurance team used this to refresh loan officers’ training, though little feedback was
conveyed about its value in the sales process. Similarly, enrollment forms were provided by the insurer and
were not subject to review for this study.
4. Study Methodology
Our research design combines a randomized control trial with qualitative research to study various elements
of the crop insurance offer. Specifically, we test the impact of unbundling the insurance offer from the
loan application process on purchase decisions and recall of product information. We also explore clients’
and loan officers’ perceptions of the insurance product, as well as aspects of the client relationship and
insurance offer that may influence purchase decisions, understanding, and recall of product details.
4.1. Sample selection
The quantitative sample included individual loan applicants of nine Crezcamos branch offices who had
at least one insurable crop and applied for a loan between 11 March and 31 October 2015. The sample
included first-time and repeat borrowers of Crezcamos, and applicants whose loans were approved and
denied. It was determined that these clients would likely not be familiar with the crop insurance product
as it was a new product in the region. They also share similar demographic characteristics as loan-eligible
farmers.
4.2. The sales intervention
To unbundle the insurance offer from the loan application process, we randomly assigned individuals who
were in the process of applying for a loan to be offered the crop insurance product at one of two distinct
times: during the visit to the client’s farm, or several weeks later after the loan had been processed. The
protocol for this intervention is summarized in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Protocol for the Sales Intervention
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Loan officers used a “randomizer” smartphone application to assign loan applicants who had an insurable
6
crop into one of two groups. The “joint insurance offer” group—the control group—was offered the crop
insurance product during the same visit as the loan application—a time when other insurance products
are also offered. The “separate insurance offer” group was offered the insurance during a later visit after
the loan was either approved and disbursed or denied. Loan decisions and, when relevant, disbursements
7
generally occur within one week of the loan application. The second visit required to complete the separate
insurance offer occurred after this time, but not on the same day as the loan disbursement. This second
visit generally occurred on the client’s farm, although it could also occur in another convenient location.
Because the second visit needed to complete the separate offer entailed a substantial added burden for
8
loan officers, they were offered incentives to increase compliance in this study. For loan applicants in the
9
separate offer group, loan officers did not mention the crop insurance product before the second visit. At
least three weeks after the insurance offer, loan applicants were contacted by telephone to complete a
short survey.
4.3. Sources of quantitative data
The total quantitative sample includes 368 individuals; it comprises all valid uses of the randomizer application
10
for a Crezcamos loan applicant who grew an insurable crop. The main sources of data used in our
quantitative analysis are as follows:
1. Administrative data from Crezcamos on loan applicants offered the insurance product, including
demographics, loan data, and information about the farm.
2. Administrative data from the insurance company that underwrites the insurance product for individuals
who purchased insurance, including the amount of coverage purchased, the crop(s) covered, and
the area covered.
3. A brief telephone survey administered to individuals who were offered the insurance product, to
confirm that the insurance was offered, test clients’ understanding and memory of product details,
and understand some basic client perceptions of the product and the offer.
11 The
In total, 154 loan applicants responded to the survey, representing a response rate of 42 percent.
relatively low response rate can be explained by the difficulty of reaching farmers who work long hours
and live in remote rural areas where phone signals are weak or nonexistent, despite their having access
to their own or shared mobile phone. It may also reflect clients’ mistrust and hesitance to share personal
6. The randomization results synced automatically to a database in the Crezcamos system, allowing the research
team to track and monitor compliance.
7. At times these can be delayed for several weeks (e.g., if additional documentation or a co-signor is required).
8. Loan officers received a small cash prize for each separate offer completed. In addition, for each insurance offer
(joint or separate) completed, the loan officer received an entry in a lottery to win an iPad.
9. Loan officers were instructed that if any loan applicant in the separate offer group asked them about the crop
insurance before the second visit, they should proceed with the offer at that time, but we are not aware of any
such instances.
10. Loan applicants assigned to the separate offer group for whom the insurance offer could not be completed
(because, for example, they sold their farm or no longer grew an insurable crop at the time of the second visit) were
not included in the sample (six loan applicants). When the insurance offer could have been made but was not
(because, for example, the loan officer did not complete the second visit in time or the loan applicant refused the
second visit), the individual was kept in the sample, consistent with an intent-to-treat analysis (13 loan applicants).
11. We attempted to contact all members of the sample for surveys—of those who could not be surveyed, about 60
be reached
percent could not by telephone due to low connectivity and inconsistent access to telephones, and
40 percent refused to complete the survey.
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information over the phone. Survey respondents were not Descriptive statistics of
significantly different from nonrespondents in their demographic
12 Table 1. the quantitative sample
or socioeconomic characteristics. Respondents were, however,
13
more likely to have purchased insurance and bought larger
14
amounts of coverage than nonrespondents. To the extent that Sample size 368
these differences bias our findings, they are biased in a way that
reinforces rather than contradicts the conclusions of our study. Female 25%
Average age 44.6
4.4. Descriptive statistics of the quantitative sample Married 68%
Table 1 summarizes basic descriptive statistics of the quantitative Average number 2.9
sample, including demographic, socioeconomic, and loan data. of children
Most of the loan applicants in the sample were married men Average number of 1.1
who had some formal education, although few attended school economic dependents
beyond the primary level. They had an average of 2.9 children Any formal 93%
but only 1.1 dependents living with them at the time. The average education
loan size of US$1,268 represents over four months of the average Average number of 2.4
income for a rural household in Colombia, according to 2014 economic activities
census data (DANE 2015). This loan size reflects the relatively high Own home 70%
investment needs in agriculture, which are difficult to finance with Loan denied 11%
15
household income.
Average loan $1,268
All individuals in the sample had some agricultural activity as their amount (US$)
primary economic activity, and all grow at least one insurable Average loan term 20.1
crop (which may be a primary or secondary source of their (months)
income). Ninety percent grew an insurable crop as their primary Assigned to separate 47%
economic activity (see Figure 2). Permanent crops (coffee and offer
cocoa, in particular) are by far the most common primary crops Purchased crop
(see Figure 3). insurance 23%
12. Including age, gender, marital status, number of children, number of Primary economic
economic dependents, home ownership, education, loan term and
amount, and number of economic activities. Figure 2. activities, by category
13. Twenty-eight percent of survey respondents and 19 percent
of nonrespondents purchased insurance (p=0.048 from a t-test
of the difference in take-up between survey respondents and
nonrespondents; a p-value of less than 0.05 indicates a statistically
significant result, while p-values between 0.05 and 0.10 are marginally
significant).
14. Survey respondents who bought insurance purchased an average of
US$1,567 of coverage and nonrespondents purchased an average
of US$932 (p=0.039 from a t-test of the difference in coverage
amount between survey respondents and nonrespondents).
15. For a family of four in rural Colombia, average household income
in 2014 was approximately US$300; the national poverty line is set
at US$170 for a rural household of four. Income and expenditure
data collected by Crezcamos are not reliable for the purpose of this
study, so we do not report them in this paper.
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Figure 3. Most common primary economic activities
4.5. Qualitative data
Our main source of qualitative data was a series of 3016 in-person Descriptive statistics of
qualitative interviews with current Crezcamos borrowers. These
were identified through the three branch offices with the largest Table 2. the qualitative sample
number of loan applicants included in the study (Rionegro, Lebrija,
and Socorro). Clients were selected primarily based on their
location vis-à-vis main roads and branches to facilitate access. Sample size 30
They typically lived and worked on remote farms with limited road Female 32%
access but within 45–60 minutes of a small-town branch. Table Married 64%
2 provides summary information on the qualitative sample. Most
of the individuals interviewed also form part of the quantitative Permanent crop(s) 100%
sample. Qualitative interviews probed the issues of trust, pressure, Transitory crop(s) 24%
distraction, understanding, recall, and empowerment related to Assigned to separate
the borrowing process and the insurance offer. offer 44%
Most qualitative interviews took place in borrowers’ homes; others Offered crop insurance 68%
were conducted in conveniently located restaurants or, in a few before interview
cases, in Crezcamos branches. Nine qualitative interviews were Purchased crop
held over the phone with Crezcamos clients to review and probe insurance 50%
more deeply some of their responses from the quantitative phone
survey (these are not included in Table 2).
Qualitative client interviews were complemented by insights shared by Crezcamos loan officers and their
supervisors on the insurance product, the sales process, and their clients’ reactions. Our research team
maintained close contact with them throughout the study preparation and implementation period, and
recorded the feedback they shared. During field visits, seven loan officers were interviewed individually
of the study.17 Focus groups were also held with loan officers
about their sales process and their impressions
from the three branches with the highest sales over the course of the study. The first took place mid-study to
understand some of the hesitation loan officers showed to selling insurance and the final two at the end of
the study to gain loan officer impressions of client understanding, recall, and purchase decisions.
16. Twenty-four individuals were interviewed in May 2015 and six in December 2015. In addition, nine qualitative
interviews were conducted by telephone.
17. Of the 39 loan officers who participated in the study, these loan officers were selected because they had a large
number of insurance offers within the study period.
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5. Findings
This section explores our study’s findings on clients’ insurance purchase decisions, perceptions, and
understanding. Although overall take-up of the Crezcamos crop insurance compared favorably to take-up
of similar insurance products in other countries, we found no statistically significant impact on take-up from
separating the insurance offer from the loan application process. Overall, clients purchased relatively small
amounts of coverage when compared to the maximum amounts they could have purchased. Recall of
the details of the product and purchase decisions after the offer was quite low, in both the bundled and
separate offer groups. In addition, we find that the influences of pressure and distraction, two pathways
by which bundling the products could influence understanding and purchases, are less significant than
hypothesized. Clients perceived the purchase decision as truly voluntary, and the product’s coverage,
relevance, and price all greatly influenced purchase decisions. We describe below general findings related
to purchase decisions and product perceptions (Sections 5.1–5.3), recall of information (Section 5.4), and
pressure (Sections 5.5–5.6), before delving into the impact of the unbundling intervention (Section 5.7).
5.1. Take-up rate was comparatively high, but average coverage was low
Take-up of the crop insurance was 23 percent across the full sample, a take-up rate higher than many
recorded for agricultural microinsurance products (see Section 2.1). Table 3 summarizes clients’ purchase
decisions. There were stark differences in take-up between crop types, with much higher take-up among
farmers whose primary crop is permanent, and lower take-up among farmers with transitory crops.18 This
difference likely reflects differences in the product structure and pricing: the insurance for transitory crops
is, on average, more expensive than coverage for permanents as a percentage of the insured amount.19
In addition, the product is perceived by many clients to be more relevant for permanent crops for several
reasons (see Section 5.3).
Most policyholders purchased relatively small amounts Table 3. Insurance purchase decisions
of coverage, on average US$1,257 (about the size of the
average loan amount), although coverage amounts Purchased insurance
varied substantially, ranging from US$167 to US$8,333. (% of full sample) 22.8
On average, 69 percent of the premium amount was
subsidized, and policyholders paid US$13.51 out of pocket. Permanent crop owners who
Policyholders purchased, on average, only a quarter of purchased (% of permanent 25.2
the maximum coverage allowed by the insurer for their crop owners)
crops. Median coverage is even lower, at 17 percent of Transitory crop owners who
the amount allowed. We discuss some possible reasons purchased (% of transitory 7.8
for these purchase decisions (including price, quality crop owners)
perceptions, understanding, and pressure) in Sections Average premium paid (US$) $13.51
5.2–5.6. Take-up between the joint sale and separate sale Average subsidy amount (US$) $30.14
groups did not differ, which we discuss in greater detail in
Section 5.7. Average coverage amount (US$) $1,257
Coverage as a percentage of 25.1
maximum allowed coverage
18. Differences between the two groups in amount of coverage and premium paid could not be analyzed due to the
small number of purchasers for transitory crops.
19. Presubsidy premiums are 6–9 percent of the insured amount for transitory crops and are 3–4 percent of the insured
amount for permanent crops; most transitory crops also have a lower premium subsidy than permanent.
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
5.2. Price was highly relevant to the purchase decision
About a quarter of the survey respondents who did not purchase the
insurance cited price and liquidity constraints as the reason for this
decision.20 Among those who purchased the insurance, the level of “When we know the client’s
coverage also suggests a high degree of price sensitivity. Despite the high cash flow, we sometimes begin
subsidies, purchasers generally bought only small amounts of coverage. from the bottom [of the range
This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Cole et al. 2011; Giné, Menand, of premiums].”
Townsend, and Vickery 2010), which find demand for microinsurance —Crezcamos loan officer with
products to be extremely price sensitive. Price was particularly relevant high average premium and
to clients with smaller farms and loan sizes, who bought smaller amounts below-average take-up
of coverage (both in absolute size and in relation to the maximum
21
amount they could have purchased) than borrowers with larger loans.
Qualitative interviews also suggest that the relatively low amount of
coverage purchased in part reflects the impact of “sticker shock” among “I start to quote insurance
the target clientele who had never been offered insurance products from the amount needed to
with premiums of this size and for whom crop insurance was a new and cover the client’s investment in
unfamiliar product. Most clients’ prior experience with insurance was his crop.”
limited to the life and accident coverage offered by Crezcamos and
other lenders, which has much lower premiums. Starting premiums for —Crezcamos loan officer with
the life and temporary disability insurance offered by Crezcamos were lowest average premium and
approximately US$1.70, while the crop insurance, even at the relatively highest take-up
small amounts purchased, had an average premium of nearly eight
times that amount. In qualitative interviews, many farmers reported
purchasing insurance as a function of the premium cost rather than the
amount of coverage that this premium corresponded to. Rather than taking into account their needs in
case of a weather event (i.e., the amount of their original investment), these clients considered their liquidity
at the time of purchase. In some cases, the inability to finance a purchase may have either reduced the
willingness to pay higher premiums or delayed the purchase decision.
While liquidity was broadly relevant to decision-making for many clients, a minority of clients were constrained
by their income. For these clients, low income and an overall limited capacity to pay (regardless of the
availability of financing for the premium) also influenced their decision. Crezcamos loan officers noted that
a small number of their agricultural clients (estimated at 15–25 percent) are subsistence farmers who have
limited or no spare cash at the end of the month after paying their bills.
Qualitative interview responses suggest that other considerations beyond liquidity and income constraints
may have also influenced their willingness to pay. Some clients said they began at a low premium amount to
“try the insurance out” because it was their first crop insurance purchase. Others suggested they may have
bought a low amount as a way to avoid rejecting the offer altogether, though they were not convinced of
clients’
the product. Several loan officers understood their financial constraints and behaviors and refrained
from offering larger amounts of coverage from the onset, claiming that they would “lose the client” or
“scare the client” if they introduced the product with a large coverage amount. Instead, they began the
sale by immediately offering small coverage amounts to some of their clients rather than guiding them to
20. Other common reasons given for nonpurchase included concerns about the product’s relevance or quality
(together, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the reasons for nonpurchase and discussed in Section 5.3)
and delays or other logistical problems (14 percent of nonpurchasers).
21. Insurance purchasers with a loan size below the median amount bought on average US$988 of coverage, or 22
percent of the maximum coverage they could have purchased. Those with a loan size above the median bought
on average US$1,514 of coverage, or 28 percent of the maximum coverage they could have purchased.
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think in terms of the amount invested and the cost of replacing their plants. In the case of loan officers who
felt their clients were able to pay for more coverage, some noted that they instead offered to cover the
full amount of the investment from the onset, and would reduce this amount only at the insistence of the
client. In many cases, according to loan officers, this latter strategy would lead clients to reject the offer
altogether.
5.3. Perceptions of the product’s quality and relevance varied but were generally positive
Perceptions of the product shared during qualitative interviews were generally positive, even among
nonpurchasers, who often thought that the product could help some people or that they might purchase
it in the future. A small minority did not find the product useful at all. Table 4 summarizes the positive and
negative attributes of the product reported by clients in qualitative interviews. The main explanations
respondents gave for the product’s value were its accessible price and the importance of the covered risk.
Complaints about the product centered on the risks and events it does not cover and/or the respondent’s
other means of dealing with climate risks.
Table 4. Client perceptions of the crop insurance (qualitative interviews)
Positive attributes Negative attributes or
of the product reasons the product is not relevant
“The world has changed… and you It doesn’t “My greatest risk is related to
The risks it can never know when that type of cover my most market price, especially with the
covers are weather damage will come here.” important risks. pigs—the costs are consistent
important. and very high, but the price in the
“I think a lot about the risks of my crop.” I’m very unlikely market varies a lot.”
Price is “Last year, there was a bad drought in to get anything “Last year I lost half of my
accessible the summer.” from it. guanabana crop, but the trees
and/or didn’t die.”
subsidy is “The price is economical for what it I don’t face very
helpful. covers.” much risk, or I “We chose to plant the crops we
“It wasn’t expensive… that’s why we cope with my risk have because they’re less risky.”
It protects my bought it.” in other ways. “The farm is secure. Yes, there are
investment. risks, but we won’t lose all of the
“It’s a manner of protecting our work.” I can’t afford it. crop.”
Relevance of the coverage seems to have been the single most important determinant of purchase
decisions. Among nonpurchasers who responded to our survey, the most common reason given for failing
to purchase the product was that it was not relevant to their needs (cited by 39 percent of self-reported
nonpurchasers). Of these people, about half referred to the limited climate risk their crop faces or the steps
22
they have already taken to mitigate that risk.
22. About a quarter of respondents mentioned the product’s price and/or liquidity constraints as a reason for not
purchasing. A smaller number of respondents did not buy because they did not trust or know enough about the
product (11 percent), because their loan was delayed or not approved, or other logistical problems (14 percent).
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In qualitative interviews, nonpurchasers universally
described the product as covering only a small
portion (one-third or less) of the total risks their crop
faces. However, even among purchasers who saw
the product as valuable, some reported that it
covered only a small portion of their risks. While they
understood that the product plays a limited role and
were aware of the important risks that it does not
cover, they still viewed it as valuable.
Loan officers’ perceptions of the product were also Many Crezcamos borrowers have diversified income
generally positive. The importance of the covered streams, including various crops, livestock, and
risks resonated with them, in particular as a failed nonfarm income.
crop can impact a borrower’s ability to repay the
loan. Loan officers also recognized the potential of
the product to differentiate them from other lenders “Because of that weather event, my client
who do not offer anything similar. defaulted… she lost her crops, and had no
A clue about the importance of product relevance means to pay the loan.”
in determining take-up emerges when we analyze
insurance offers for permanent and transitory crops “It’s another product we have to offer clients.
separately (see Table 5). For permanent crops there Other lenders don’t have this insurance.”
is no difference in uptake between the joint and
separate groups. However, among insurance offers “My client came into the office the other
for transitory crops, no borrower in the separate offer day to claim 7 million pesos. When she
group purchased the insurance. bought the insurance, her husband was very
The preference among farmers for covering angry that she wasted her money. Now they
permanent crops can also be partially explained by both came in and told me I was their good
the product losing relevance when the offer happens friend.”
too late in the growing cycle. This may have been
for separate insurance offers, —Crezcamos loan officers, reflecting on the
particularly relevant
which were made several weeks after the loan benefits the products may have to them
application. A similar delay would not have impacted
the product’s relevance to a permanent crop, as
that coverage is not linked to a growing season. This
nuance suggests that the product was understood Take-up among transitory and
and valued for its relevance by clients at the time of
the offer. We expand on the understanding of the Table 5. permanent crop holders
product by clients in the next section.
All crops Permanent Transitory
(n=366) (n=315) (n=51)
All 22.8% 25.2% 7.8%
offers
Joint 24.5% 26.5% 13.3%
offers
Separate 20.9% 23.8% 0.0%
offers
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Although some transitory crop holders in the joint offer group purchased the insurance, take-up in this group
is still far lower than it is for permanent crop holders. This may also be driven by the product’s perceived
relevance for different crops. The term of coverage is shorter for transitory crops than for permanents.23
When coupled with higher premiums, this led some clients to perceive coverage for transitory crops as
offering lower value-for-money, though it is also more likely to result in a benefit. Further, about half of our
sample grew either coffee or cocoa as a primary crop. These are permanent crops that are in general
more vulnerable to climate risks than other permanent crops in the region. They are also among the most
profitable crops in the region, and require substantial investment and care, suggesting a high return on
investment but also high risk.
5.4. Product understanding was relatively high, but recall was low
Qualitative interviews with both clients and loan officers
suggest that the sales protocol used in this study “[My loan officer] is very helpful; if I have a
succeeded in conveying to most clients the information question or need anything, he explains it to
they needed to make an informed purchase decision. me.”
However, despite this good initial understanding, survey
responses reveal low recall of product information,
reflecting a possible gap in clients’ ability to maintain and “I didn’t have any doubts after the
use their policies effectively without additional support explanation.”
from Crezcamos. The low recall we find is consistent with
the literature (see Section 2.6). “[The loan officer] didn’t really spend much
time explaining the insurance. He said an
Qualitative interviews revealed that at the moment the estimate of the price, but I don’t remember. It
crop insurance is explained to them, clients generally was very fast—I think he was in a hurry, and I
understand the pertinent details quite well. To test also had to get back to work.”
this hypothesis, we interviewed clients about the loan
officers’ (earlier) insurance offer but also asked loan “We were working on the farm when our
officers to repeat sections of the sales protocol during loan officer arrived but we still took the time
visits and asked clients for feedback immediately after. to listen to him for a long time so that he
This approach enabled us to better understand how could explain [the product].”
clients understood and perceived the product at the
time it was explained to them. —Crezcamos clients, expressing different views on
Clients felt that their loan officers were able to explain the amount of information they were given
the product clearly and answer any questions they
had. Most felt that they understood the product well
enough to make a decision, although a few described
the explanation as rushed. Immediately after viewing
the video and hearing the loan officer’s explanation of
the product, clients could explain the basic features of
coverage, including the events covered, the damage
their crop must suffer to be eligible for a claim, the
approximate price, and the coverage amount. Some
were able to point to more detailed features of the
23. Coverage for permanent crops is annual, while the length
of coverage for transitory crops is linked to the crop cycle
(150–300 days). Crezcamos loan officer and client watch the crop
insurance video together.
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
product, such as the government subsidy, which is featured prominently in the video. Many also understood
there was a small deductible portion that would not be covered. It was also clear that photos of their crops
would be taken prior to enrolling, and that an assessment would take place in the case of a climate event
to evaluate their eligibility for a claim payment. There is suggestive evidence from both loan officer and
client interviews that information on topics not included in the video was less consistently communicated
and less clearly understood. For example, one client we interviewed one day after the insurance offer noted
that he was never told an exact coverage amount (this information is not included in the video because
it is based on an amount ostensibly chosen by the client). Some loan officers also noted that instead of
using worksheets to calculate premium and benefit amounts for clients, they sometimes estimated these
numbers.
We measured recall of product details at a time three or more weeks after the insurance offer through
telephone surveys. Despite understanding product details well initially, both qualitative interviews and
survey responses suggest that clients struggled later to recall this information. In qualitative interviews, clients
who had been offered the product more than a few weeks earlier generally needed to be reminded of
the details of the product. Many survey respondents failed to remember even the most basic information
about the product and their purchase choices. We believe that the survey responses may underestimate
24
respondents’ recall, but in any case they reflect substantial gaps in memory. Thirty percent of survey
respondents answered incorrectly whether or not they purchased the insurance—nearly all of these were
25
individuals who reported purchasing the insurance but for whom a policy was not issued.
Table 6 summarizes the recall of product and purchase decisions among purchasers.
Table 6. Recall of product and purchase decision (among purchasers)a
% of purchasers
Incorrectly reported that they did not purchase insurance 4.65
b
Incorrect or do not remember the premium paid 58.54
Incorrect or do not remember crop covered 29.27
c 58.54
Incorrect or do not remember covered events
d 96.96
Incorrect or do not remember benefit amount
a. Responses from telephone survey (n=41)
b. Responses within 10 percent of the actual premium paid were considered correct. Eighty-one percent of nonpurchasers
did not remember the amount they would have paid if they had bought, but where nonpurchasers mentioned a price
they would have paid, their response could not be verified.
c. Gave one or more incorrect response to the question “what risks or events does the insurance cover?”
d. Responses within 10 percent of actual benefit amount were considered correct.
24. Audits of survey results suggest that some respondents may have misunderstood some of questions they were
asked about product details.
25. Audits of survey results suggest that some respondents may have misunderstood this question (perhaps thinking
that it referred to other insurance purchased through Crezcamos); it is also possible that some of these respondents
thought they enrolled in the crop insurance but there was some problem in the enrollment process, although we
did not investigate this directly.
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While nearly all purchasers correctly remembered having purchased insurance, recall of other relevant
information was far lower. Fifty-eight percent of purchasers showed some confusion about the covered
events, giving at least one incorrect answer when asked what events are covered. Nonpurchasers were
even more likely to answer this question incorrectly.
One of the main risks of poor recall is that clients may forget to renew policies. In the case of Crezcamos,
this risk is particularly relevant due to the mismatch between loan and insurance terms: insurance policy
terms vary between 3 and 12 months, while loan terms vary between 3 and 36 months. A branch manager
noted that recently a client arrived at the branch infuriated that he was not reminded to renew his policy.
His mango crop had suffered a loss only a few weeks after the policy lapsed and he had no way of making
a claim. Another risk is that policyholders who suffer from weather-related events might not make a claim at
all because they don’t recall owning insurance or how the claims process works. Some policyholders may
have unrealistic expectations about the size of a payout because they do not remember the coverage
amount. A loan officer shared the story of a client who received a small payout when he made a claim,
and was surprised and disappointed by how little he received. However, the loan officer recounted that the
client was ultimately happy because “at least he received something.”
Failure to recall certain details of the insurance product, however, should not always be considered a
problem for the policyholder. Few individuals, in developed and developing countries alike and regardless
of their education level or socioeconomic status remember detailed features of their insurance contracts.
However, low recall points to a need for additional support (by reminding clients of pertinent information
at times it is needed or helping them make claims, renew coverage, or take other steps needed to use
the product effectively). Here, both information and support are available at the Crezcamos branches,
where loan clients make monthly loan payments in person or through family members. Indeed, when asked
during qualitative interviews what they would do if they experienced an insured loss, most clients responded
that they would call a loan officer or visit a Crezcamos branch. One client instead referred to contact
information of the insurance company on his policy certificate. Reminder systems might also be established,
though they must be tailored to the needs and habits of the clients. We discuss the relevance and use of
reminders further in our conclusions below.
5.5. Direct pressure to purchase the product was almost completely absent
The study design required Crezcamos to shift its approach to selling the crop insurance. Prior to the study,
the insurance team trained loan officers that when a loan applicant had an insurable crop, the loan
should always come with insurance. While it was not technically mandatory, loan officers’ performance
was measured against their ability to sell a policy with every agricultural loan. Our study design relied on
a transparent and voluntary process, with little or no direct pressure to purchase. This was necessary for
purchase decisions to reflect only the (standardized) sales process and the impact of the timing intervention.
Loan officers, using the sales protocol described in Section 3.3, were successful in conveying the voluntary
nature of the product. Very few of the loan applicants surveyed (3.8 percent) reported feeling pressure
from Crezcamos or from their loan officer to purchase the product. Additionally, had clients perceived a
link between insurance purchase and loan approval, we would expect to have detected a higher take-up
rate among the joint offer group, which was not the case.
Qualitative interviews also underscored that clients truly perceived the product as a voluntary offering.
No clients who were offered the crop insurance since the study began (and since the standardized offer
protocol was implemented) mentioned in qualitative interviews feeling pressured to buy the product, and
all understood that they were free to turn it down. This approach also stands in contrast to the way other
insurance products are sold by Crezcamos staff. In particular, the sale of voluntary life insurance is integrated
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
“I knew it was “It’s not obligatory… you feel free “People assimilate the
voluntary, but my to make a choice.” information we are explaining
loan officer said better [when it is a voluntary
I had to buy it to “It was just an offer, not a sale]. Even if they don’t buy
get the loan…. It requirement.” the insurance right away, they
would be best if, will ask for it later.”
when we said no, “I knew my decision wouldn’t
they would just influence my loan approval.” “Before, we had to insist and
accept the ‘no.’” pressure clients, because we
—Borrower who, “[My loan officer] explained all had the obligation to sell.
before the study the benefits, but I decided I don’t Now, our role is to convince
began, had want it. He said ‘OK, that’s fine.’” them.”
been pressured —Crezcamos borrowers who were —Crezcamos loan officers,
to purchase the offered the crop insurance during the reflecting on the shift to voluntary
insurance study, reflecting on the offer offers
into the loan application so seamlessly that it can be overlooked by the client or perceived as an automatic
part of the loan process, rather than a distinct choice. When asked in qualitative interviews about any
other insurance coverage, respondents were more likely to mention the insurance they have through other
lenders than the products Crezcamos offers. However, nearly three-quarters of Crezcamos borrowers are
covered by the voluntary life insurance and all are covered by the mandatory credit-life product, which
suggests that some people who purchase the Crezcamos life insurance products are not fully aware of their
coverage.
5.6. Some clients may feel indirect pressure to purchase insurance, linked to low levels of empowerment
Even in the absence of direct pressure or obligation to purchase a product, it may be possible for a client
to feel compelled to buy it. This more indirect pressure could be a result of the power dynamics between
the loan officer and applicant or the stress of applying for a loan. Our qualitative interviews explored these
issues and found that different clients experience the relationship with the loan officer in very different ways.
When we asked to reflect on the relationship of borrowing and the loan application to empowerment,
loan process, because
clients gave a wide variety of responses. About two-thirds felt empowered during the
they were confident they would get the loan and/or because they knew that if denied, they could get a
loan elsewhere. The other third felt disempowered, generally because they thought there was a chance
of being rejected, because they needed the money urgently, and/or because they felt uncomfortable
that their ability to pay was being examined. Additional reasons cited for feeling less empowered included
having less understanding of financial issues than the loan officer or lower levels of education.
Crezcamos loan officers generally expressed the view that their clients dominated the relationship during
the loan application. Loan officers were keenly aware of the choices their clients have as a result of highly
competitive credit markets in the region. Some loan officers expressed reluctance to offer a product if they
are expected to obligate clients to buy it. Some mentioned feeling nervous when offering the product
because it was complicated and unfamiliar to them: “In the beginning, we felt less empowered, we didn’t
know how to sell. Now we do.” Others, however, recognized that some of their clients are more amenable
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“I feel in control when I’m “When I’m applying for a loan I “I get nervous that
applying for a loan; I don’t feel nervous… I’m thinking about the they [clients] will ask
have any doubt that I’ll possibility that it won’t be approved.” a lot of questions.”
receive it.”
“I worry that I won’t be approved, “We are afraid
“It makes me feel good when that I don’t have the right papers, that clients will see
the loan officer visits my that they’ll ask for a guarantor (which the insurance as an
farm. They recognize that, I don’t have).” obligation; we’ve
yes, we’re working hard.” lost loan clients
“One feels she has less power because of this.”
“I knew I would get the loan; because they know more than I do —Crezcamos loan
I have good credit.” [about insurance], they have studies.” officers, reflecting on
—Crezcamos borrowers who —Crezcamos borrowers who feel their insecurities early
feel empowered during the loan disempowered during the loan or in the study when
process insurance sales process offering the product
to follow their advice, particularly those with low
levels of education or who were nervous about
having their loan approved. They understood that
there are clients who feel less empowered than
others. Specifically, they referred to some clients
with low levels of education or clients who were
nervous about having their loan approved as more
willing to agree to their loan officer’s suggestions.
In sum, although clients did not feel direct coercion
or obligation to purchase the insurance, some may
have felt some indirect pressure. This pressure may
be felt particularly strongly by more vulnerable Crezcamos loan officers in Socorro, Santander
clients, who are more likely to feel overwhelmed
or intimidated by the loan process or by their lack
of familiarity with insurance.
5.7. The unbundling intervention did not influence clients
Separating the insurance offer from the loan application through the unbundling intervention did not
impact take-up. The take-up rate was higher in the bundled offer group (24.5 percent) than in the separate
offer group (20.9 percent), but the difference is not statistically significant (see Table 7). We analyzed the
data using simple t-tests as well as more robust regression models; all suggest that the difference is not
statistically significantly different from zero. We also estimated heterogeneous impacts by loan applicant’s
gender, age, education level, loan size, and crop type.26 None of the regression coefficients was statistically
significant, and the coefficients themselves vary little from subgroup to subgroup.
26. Although we find a statistically significant difference in take-up between the joint and separate offer group among
transitory crop holders, this difference seems to be driven by lower perceived relevance at the later time, rather
than from unbundling the offer from the loan application (see Section 5.3).
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Table 7. Take-up in joint and separate offer groups
27
All offers Joint offers Separate offers p-value
All crops (n=368) 22.8% 24.5% 20.9% 0.418
Permanent (n=317) 25.2% 26.5% 23.8% 0.587
Transitory (n=51) 7.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.084
We hypothesized that separating the offer of insurance from
the loan application process might affect take-up rates and “I had been working in the field, but I
understanding: (i) borrowers offered the insurance after their came to my house to speak to the loan
loan had been processed might be less stressed and worried officer. I stopped working.”
about their loan application, less likely to be cognitively
overloaded, and more likely to be receptive to information —Loan applicant who was not distracted by
about a new and complex financial product, and (ii) lower stress work at the time of the loan application
and cognitive load would translate into a higher understanding
of the product. We now turn to estimating the importance of
each of these factors.
First, distraction caused by the work or household responsibilities
interrupted during a loan officer visit, the multiple questions
required for the loan application, the need to find documents “It was at the same visit, but I didn’t
and bills to show loan officers, and the stress of understanding feel distracted by the loan. “[When
and applying for a loan could create distractions that might we talked about the insurance], we’d
lead an individual to put off the purchase of another product, or
to understand or remember less about a product he purchased. finished talking about the loan. It was a
separate moment.”
However, respondents in qualitative interviews who had —Loan applicant who perceived the
received the insurance offer during the same visit as the loan insurance offer as distinct from the loan
application did not directly report being distracted by the process
loan application process when their loan officer explained the
insurance, nor did their responses indirectly suggest that they
might have been distracted at that time. Clients generally
perceived the insurance offer as distinct from the loan process,
brought up.
which ended before the insurance was They felt
that they were sufficiently able to focus on the insurance offer
and to make a sound decision at that time. “It makes sense to buy crop insurance
Loan officers also perceived the joint offer as more effective, in from Crezcamos, because they are
large part because the risk is most salient at the time of the loan lending me money for the crops.”
application, given the large investment clients are planning —Crezcamos client, reflecting the salience
to make in their crops. They reported that loan applicants are of the insurance offer during the loan
thinking about the productivity of their crop and their capacity application
to repay the loan, and are more receptive to an insurance
product that protects their investment at this time.
27. P-value from a t-test of the difference in mean take-up between
the joint offers and separate offers groups.
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Table 8. Recall of product information in the joint and separate offer groups
All offers Joint offers Separate offers p-value
Responded incorrectly to
survey question “did you buy 29.9% 24.7% 36.2% 0.122
the crop insurance?”
Don’t remember premium 70.1% 64.7% 76.8% 0.104
charged
Incorrect about covered 68.8% 69.4% 68.1% 0.864
events
Loan applicants receiving both the joint and separate offers showed limited recall of the details when
surveyed over the phone. Table 8 summarizes the accuracy of respondents’ survey responses on product
information in the joint and separate offer groups.
Overall, nearly 70 percent of clients did not recall the
premium charged for the insurance28 and a similar
proportion made errors in describing the covered
events. The differences in recall of product information
between the two groups are not statistically significant,
either when analyzed with a t-test (as shown in Table
29
5.5) or in a regression framework. The averages,
however, suggest that people who were assigned
to the separate offer group may have recalled less
than those receiving the joint offer. Because clients
were randomly assigned into the two groups, any
differences in recall at the time of the survey should
reflect differences in initial understanding (rather than
differences in the amount of information forgotten
between the offer and the survey). This runs contrary to
our hypothesis that the joint offer, through distraction Crezcamos borrower shows his coffee seedlings to
and “information overload” associated with the loan researchers.
process, might result in clients understanding and
retaining less information, and suggests that bundling
the offer of several financial products may exploit a
moment of attention to a specific activity, in this case,
30
their crop investment.
28. It is likely that many of the remaining 30 percent of respondents, who gave some cost in response to this question,
did not recall the exact price (though the price offered could not be verified for those who chose not to purchase).
29. Including standard errors clustered at the branch level.
30. Clients who received insurance in a joint offer may also have been more likely to be reminded of the insurance
by promotional materials at the Crezcamos branch when they visited for loan disbursement shortly after the loan
application. Separate offer clients also would have been exposed to the same materials, but before their insurance
offer when it was likely less salient to them. Those clients may or may not have revisited the branch between the
insurance offer and the survey.
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
6. Conclusion
Sales of agricultural insurance to low-income farmers are constrained by low consumer demand, partly
influenced by products that were poorly designed, unaffordable, or sold ineffectively. Our study reveals
some of the factors influencing consumer choice and behavior to better understand the opportunities
and constraints to purchases of crop insurance, particularly as they relate to the loan application process.
In contrast with our initial hypothesis, we do not find any overall impact on take-up or understanding from
unbundling the insurance offer from the loan process; Section 6.1 reviews the possible limitations and
implications of this finding. While many agricultural insurance programs struggle to reach even middling
levels of take-up, our research suggests that a bundled crop insurance product for low-income farmers can
have comparatively high overall take up if it is voluntary, affordable, perceived by farmers to be relevant
to their needs, and well-understood. In Section 6.2, we discuss the implications of each of these features in
light of our study findings. Regardless of how the product is delivered and explained, recall is likely to be low
after only a short time; this suggests an important role for reminders and other ongoing support, which we
discuss in Section 6.3. Finally, we identify in Section 6.4 implications from this study for programs considering
the bundling of other types of financial products and services.
6.1. Distraction and cognitive load did not affect take-up, understanding, or recall
We tested whether distraction and cognitive load during the loan process played a role in decreasing
take-up or understanding of the crop insurance product by randomly assigning some clients to receive an
unbundled offer at a separate time after their loan was approved or denied. Contrary to our hypothesis,
however, separating the insurance offer from the loan application process did not increase take-up of the
product, nor did it improve clients’ understanding or recall of purchase decisions. Our qualitative research
suggests that distraction was not a relevant influence for Crezcamos clients during either the joint or
separate offer. Even when the insurance was offered during the same visit as the loan, it was perceived as
a distinct stage, after the loan paperwork had been completed. The unique context in which this product
was offered (i.e., in a quiet spot at the client’s home, with limited time pressure) may have contributed to
the limited importance of distraction. In another context, such as a crowded marketplace, distraction may
play a far greater role; adding a new product offer in that context could lead to information overload and
different take-up and understanding results than a separate offer in the same context.
We also hypothesized that some clients (particularly those receiving the joint offer) might feel some pressure
to purchase insurance even if it was explained to them as voluntary, for example, if they thought the insurance
purchase might influence their loan approval. Overall, we do not find strong evidence of any such pressure,
although there is some suggestion that more vulnerable clients or those who were more worried about their
loan being denied might have felt some pressure. In another context, with loan applicants who have less
experience borrowing and/or fewer available lenders to choose from, the influence of pressure during a
bundled offer might be much greater.
6.2. Drivers of client purchases
Voluntary
The approach to offering crop insurance adopted in this study was successful in making clients’ purchase
decisions truly voluntary. This may have reduced overall take-up but contributed to clients’ good initial
understanding of the product. This approach required a shift in thinking for loan officers and other staff. It
relies on informing and convincing clients of the insurance product’s value, rather than pressuring or insisting.
From a consumer’s perspective, a truly voluntary offer, combined with sufficient information, grants them
autonomy to make choices about the financial services they use. This autonomy can empower customers
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in relation to their financial service providers by conveying the message that they can be trusted to make
good decisions on their own behalf. Whether or not they purchased the crop insurance product, Crezcamos
clients who had been offered it appreciated the offer and the loan officer’s respect for their decision.
While the shift to voluntary sales is likely to decrease sales (and commissions) in the short term, it may lead
to medium-term commercial gains for the financial service provider. Crezcamos loan officers perceived
this shift positively. Making a new product, which other lenders do not have, available to customers has
created an opportunity for Crezcamos to differentiate its product offering in a competitive market. Offering
that product voluntarily rather than obligating or pressuring clients has created a new opportunity to build
and strengthen customer relationships and differentiate its customer service from that of other lenders. It
also protected the competitive terms of their loan product, which was not automatically burdened with
additional costs of the insurance for those who did not want it. Finally, when loan officers offer voluntary
products they must convince clients of their value, rather than relying on obligation or pressure to make the
sale; this may ultimately increase clients’ satisfaction with the bundled product.
Relevant
Perceptions of the product shared during qualitative interviews were generally positive, even among
nonpurchasers, who often thought that the product could help some people or that they might purchase
it in the future. Respondents with favorable opinions cited its accessible price and the importance of the
covered risk. Complaints about the product centered on the risks and events it does not cover, including
price (market) risk, plagues, low yields, and the risk of illness or disability that might restrict farmers from work.
They also considered that respondents had access to and used other tools to mitigate climate risks. The
broad range of risks, and of available tools to mitigate risk, speak to the importance of offering coverage
that is relevant to insured populations.
At 23 percent, take-up of the crop insurance compares favorably to similar products in other contexts but
leaves many Crezcamos clients with no insurance coverage. Among those who bought the product, the
levels bought were quite low—on average a quarter of the coverage allowed. Price sensitivity, perceived
limitations of the product, and the novelty of the insurance product may all have contributed to these
low levels of coverage. While Crezcamos borrowers have experience with other types of insurance, crop
with the product and hearing about claims
insurance is a new and complex concept for them. Experience
that are paid may build trust, leading to greater take-up rates and higher levels of coverage over time.
Crezcamos staff view the low level of coverage that clients purchased as inadequate to meet their needs.
However, some clients may disagree. Insurance is only one tool of many that these farmers can use to
manage the risks they face. It covers important (and growing) weather risks, but does not address their other
risks. Moreover, especially in the case of permanent crops, the crop insurance covers only extreme events. To
cope with the remaining risk, farmers turn to income diversification, commonly growing a range of transitory
and permanent crops, raising livestock, and/or working outside the farm. The region of Colombia in which
our study took place is uniquely well-suited to support this type of diversification. Farmers also choose crops,
inputs, and technical strategies to mitigate risk. Given their keen awareness of the risks they face, as well
as the many tools they already use to mitigate that risk, it may not be surprising that some farmers, even
while viewing insurance as useful, choose to purchase only a small amount of coverage. The truly voluntary
insurance offer leaves farmers free to make this purchase decision in light of their own understanding of their
risks and the tools available to mitigate them.
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Affordable
Cost was an important factor in customers’ purchase decisions, which suggest a high degree of price
sensitivity that is consistent with prior studies of insurance demand. Lower take-up of the (more expensive)
insurance for transitory crops is one reflection of this, as are the low levels of coverage that most clients
purchased. Cost was particularly relevant for those with smaller farms and loan sizes, who bought smaller
amounts of coverage (both in absolute size and in relation to the maximum amount they could have
purchased) than other borrowers. As smaller, lower-income farmers may be more price sensitive than others,
it may be useful to engage in a segmentation strategy that targets the smallest farms and/or loan sizes
with a particularly small and affordable crop insurance option. Anecdotally, both clients and loan officers
pointed to the importance of the government subsidy in making the product affordable. This is consistent
with prior studies of agricultural insurance, which find higher take-up in programs with subsidies (Hill and
Robles 2010; Cole et al. 2013).
Understood
By using both quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews, our study was able to gain insight into both
clients’ initial understanding of the product and their later recall of product details. Overall, the information
delivered to clients through the standardized sales protocol (particularly the video) was considered useful
by both loan officers and clients in delivering information about a highly complex product effectively. These
tools conveyed some of the most critical elements of the product that enabled clients to make a voluntary
and informed purchase decision. Our qualitative interviews revealed that when the protocol was applied,
clients understood the basic features of the crop insurance quite well: the events covered, the deductible
portion that would not be covered, the government subsidy, the process for enrolling, and that an assessment
would take place in the case of an insured event. Our study suggests that understanding can be tackled with
appropriate and informative sales tools, and that even farmers with low levels of education and knowledge
of insurance can understand the main features of a relatively complex product. These informational tools
(video, worksheet, “key points,” and guided answers to common client questions), coupled with a strong
awareness that a product is voluntary, appeared to effectively motivate farmers to make an informed
choice as to whether to purchase crop insurance. Our study also points to important issues around the
protection of low-income consumers. Specifically, when farmers felt less empowered, either because of
their lack of certainty about the outcome of their loan process, or because of other dynamics, they may
have felt subtle pressure to purchase the insurance. In such cases, having appropriate training, policies, and
controls in place at the institutional level can help to reinforce the emphasis on voluntary sales by frontline
staff.
6.3. Low recall suggests a need for ongoing support
While clients understood the product’s main features in the moment it was explained to them, this
understanding did not translate into lasting recall, even among those who purchased the product. Some
customers failed even to remember whether they purchased the product, and a majority failed to recall
the amount and events covered correctly. This information is essential to be able to use the insurance
effectively. When clients do not remember having a policy, they will not make a claim unless reminded.
When clients are not familiar with the claims process, they may not know how to initiate a claim or may have
unrealistic expectations about a payout that is due. When clients have incorrect expectations of a payout,
they may be disappointed to later receive a much lower amount. And when clients do not remember the
insurance policy’s term or know how to renew, they may unintentionally experience a lapse in coverage.
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Lack of recall may also diminish the product’s value in another way: one of the main sources of value that
agricultural insurance is intended to promote comes through incentivizing farmers to make more profitable
investments in their crops. When farmers do not remember the insurance coverage they have purchased,
it is unlikely to translate to these positive incentives.
The slightly better recall by clients who were offered the insurance jointly with their loan suggests that efforts
to make the product more relevant, for example, by selling it at a time when clients are focused on their
crop investment plans, may help clients to retain more information. However, even in this group recall of
necessary information was very low, suggesting that ongoing post-sales support is needed and that reminders
of coverage may be useful. Understanding the most appropriate content and channel for reminders is
critical. They should be designed carefully and implemented judiciously. Too frequent or indiscriminate SMS
or phone reminders may not be appreciated or may confuse clients. Rural clients are often not near their
phones, and often don’t have cell phone signals for hours at a time. Reminders that are both contextually
to be appreciated and useful. Feedback
appropriate and delivered at appropriate times are most likely
from Crezcamos staff suggests that reminders will be well-received only if they are targeted, individualized,
and extremely salient (e.g., if combined with the forecast for an upcoming weather event or news about
a recent payout on the insurance policy). Loan officers and branch staff may also play a role in reminding
clients of coverage when they may be eligible to make a claim or to renew before their policy expires.
6.4. Implications for financial service providers bundling other products and services
Our study hypothesized that there might be important pitfalls and constraints associated with bundling crop
insurance, in terms of client understanding and/or purchase decisions. By contrast, our findings suggest that
bundling may, in some contexts, create valuable opportunities rather than constraints. From the supply side,
it reduces the cost of delivery, which is particularly important in rural areas where loan officers travel large
distances to visit clients. From the demand side, rather than impeding comprehension, our study supports
a cautious suggestion that selling insurance at a time when farmers are thinking about their investments in
their crops (during the loan application) may help increase the perceived relevance of the product and
lead to greater understanding and recall.
We consider the insights from this study into the opportunities and pitfalls of bundling financial products and
services for low-income clients beyond the specific context of Crezcamos and its crop insurance. Many
strategies
financial service providers in developing countries have developed cross-selling and bundling
aimed at offering clients a more diverse and relevant set of services, and increasing the marginal gain
from costly service delivery. Credit clients might be offered savings accounts, debit cards, or insurance
services. Remittance clients are offered deposit accounts or insurance. Borrowers are often provided with
nonfinancial services such as health education and business services. Our study shows that bundling does
not necessarily reduce the relevance or understanding of “secondary” services, nor must it place excessive
pressure on clients’ cognitive load. We find that clients can pay attention and understand their options even
in a bundled offer, making informed choices. Standardizing the tools available to loan officers to explain
and sell products can help ensure that the information offered is complete and consistent, particularly
when loan officers themselves may feel pressure to explain a service that they are not yet confident about.
The greatest pitfall to the sale of a relevant and affordable secondary product, whether offered jointly
with a “lead” product or separately, appears to be low recall of product details (assuming the product is
otherwise relevant, affordable, and understood). Crop insurance, in particular, is a complex product with
multiple salient characteristics: the covered event, damage required, covered crops, deductible, premium,
benefit amount, claims process, etc. Clients are unlikely to remember all of these details for very long. This
is not necessarily a problem, because they are not called on to do so in their daily life. However, there will
be moments where remembering the salient characteristics of a secondary product is crucial. For crop
insurance, damage from weather events will trigger this need. Greater simplicity in product design can help
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RESPONSIBLE BUNDLING OF MICROFINANCE SERVICES
to ensure that clients remember the pertinent details. This would involve trade-offs, however, given that the
product’s complexity is closely tied to its attempt to cover a broad range of products with large differences
in probability of damage due to weather events. A narrower product for the three main permanent crops
(coffee, cocoa, and citrus), might be simpler but could also exclude some farmers who do not grow these
crops.
However, even with simpler products, recall should not be assumed to follow from initial understanding,
but rather encouraged throughout the lifetime of a customer’s engagement with the provider. In the case
of Crezcamos, the microfinance institution offering the insurance is the party best-suited to provide these
reminders. It is a trusted institution that has an ongoing relationship with the client in connection with the
“lead” credit product. Clients are aware of the physical location of branches and have regular contact
with their loan officers, as well as the ability to contact them when a need arises. The delivery channel is thus
well-positioned to be a resource for clients who need reminders of the crop insurance.
The case of Crezcamos suggests that the responsibility to protect consumers in low-income settings might
fall disproportionally on the distribution channel. In an ideal setting, consumers, distribution channels,
insurers, and regulators would all share the responsibility of ensuring that consumers have the information
31
and support they need. However, in practice, the allocation of responsibility may not be equal. In rural
Colombia, our study found that consumers generally understood but did not remember important details of
crop insurance they purchased. The insurance company is located in the capital, far (in both distance and
culture) from the farms of its end clients, and is not prepared or well-suited to communicate directly with
them. At the same time, regulation generally emphasizes the disclosure of information at the time of sale,
rather than post-sales support. This ecosystem leaves the distribution channel with the burden of providing
ongoing support, which is not mandated but needed in practice to protect the consumer. Microfinance
institutions and other distribution channels close to clients may be well-suited to bear this responsibility, but
may not always have the tools. In the case of Crezcamos, shifting into a voluntary insurance offer may have
been a first step in ensuring client understanding and awareness of their purchase decision. However, the
lack of recall found in our study suggests that this may not be sufficient to ensure that consumers are fully
protected. In the immediate term, the delivery channel is likely best suited to provide the support necessary
to fill this gap through post-sale support. Over time, efforts to further empower clients both to make sound
decisions and to seek information when needed would benefit clients and the institutions serving them.
31. Zimmerman et al. (2014) discusses the allocation of responsibilities for consumer protection in microinsurance
among consumers, insurers, delivery channels, and other stakeholders. The authors suggest that responsibilities be
allocated in accordance with stakeholders’ capacities, with a view to increasing the capacity of all stakeholders
(and in particular of consumers themselves) to improve consumer protection outcomes over time.
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Advancing financial inclusion to improve the lives of the poor
1825 I Street NW, 7th Floor
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www.cgap.org
Correspondence: Lisa Stahl ( lstahl@worldbank.org )
Cover Photo: Barbara Magnoni, EAConsultants
